It finally happened. Donald Trump, never short of drama or deadlines, has delivered a Ukraine-related agreement by the 1st of May. The deal – signed with limited fanfare in Washington – outlines a joint venture between the United States and Ukraine to exploit critical natural resources, including rare earth elements, lithium, titanium, and even hydrocarbons. But the most intriguing aspect of the pact is not what was included, but what was consciously omitted.
The mineral deal, formalised between US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant and Ukraine’s Economics Minister Yulia Svyrydenko, could serve as a political opening, a tentative olive branch towards ending three years of brutal war. With Ukrainian mines holding roughly 3% of the global reserves of certain strategic materials, the agreement may carry economic weight, but it’s the diplomatic subtext that has insiders talking.
A pivotal moment may have come earlier in Rome, in the hushed splendour of St Peter’s Basilica, during the funeral of Pope Francis. Presidents Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump were seen engaging in what appeared to be an intense but brief conversation in the nave. While neither side has released details of the exchange, it is believed to have paved the way for the more pragmatic, business-like agreement that followed in Washington.
This deal, it must be noted, is a marked departure from the one that sparked chaos in Trump’s Oval Office in February. Crucially, there is no language about Ukraine repaying the US for its past military aid. The notion of reparations has been dropped entirely. Instead, the profits from mineral exploitation will be reinvested directly into Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction – a subtle nod to sovereignty and stability, absent the overtones of transactionalism that have often characterised Trump’s foreign policy.
By leaving out the expected American claims for reimbursement, the deal seems to revive the spirit of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which guaranteed Ukraine’s sovereignty in exchange for nuclear disarmament. This might signal a turning point in American rhetoric – away from viewing Ukraine as a debtor nation and toward accepting it as a strategic partner.
Moscow’s response has been predictable, if frosty. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov reiterated that no peace process could be deemed viable without addressing “the root causes” of the war. These, in the Kremlin’s eyes, include Ukraine’s relationship with NATO, the country’s neutrality, and the nebulous goal of “denazification” – often interpreted as regime change.
Despite this, Vladimir Putin has made a small gesture: a proposed ceasefire from the 8th to the 10th of May, to coincide with Russia’s annual victory commemorations. The move is widely seen as a precautionary tactic to avoid a Ukrainian drone strike disrupting the Red Square parade. Ironically, this comes as Russia continues its own intensified drone campaign against Ukrainian cities.
But here again, the mineral deal breaks new ground. The US has placed no limits on NATO’s continued support for Kyiv, nor has it discouraged Ukraine’s bid for EU membership. These omissions suggest a deliberate US pivot away from Russian talking points – an acknowledgment that the geopolitical tide is shifting, if slowly.
Meanwhile, Trump’s reluctance to engage in prolonged wars is manifest once more. By pushing economic development and defence investment rather than boots-on-the-ground escalation, he appears to be encouraging Europe to shoulder the burden of its own neighbourhood conflicts.
This puts fresh pressure on Sir Keir Starmer’s Labour government. Despite last year’s bold promise of a “root and branch” Strategic Defence Review, there has been scant progress. The review is now in its sixth draft, with delays blamed on inter-departmental wrangling, particularly from the Treasury and Foreign Office.
France is set to unveil its own review imminently. Britain, by contrast, has no firm publication date. With American patience thinning and NATO allies growing restless, the UK is under increasing scrutiny. Britain’s pledge to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2026 is already seen as insufficient; many experts warn that 4% is now necessary.
If this mineral deal marks the beginning of a post-war settlement, it also signals the start of a new era of responsibility for Europe. The real story is not about rare earths or lithium, but about whether Britain and its allies are ready to act – or remain paralysed by policy inertia.