As President Joe Biden prepares for his first and likely only trip to Africa as president, scheduled for December in Angola, the reality of the U.S.’s diminishing influence on the continent has become increasingly evident. Despite efforts to engage, the Biden administration, like its predecessors, has struggled to prioritize Africa in its foreign policy, leaving the door open for other global powers, particularly Russia and China, to fill the void. Whether Donald Trump or Kamala Harris takes over the White House next year, neither is expected to fare much better in reversing this trend.
Biden’s visit to Angola is a small gesture in the grand scheme of U.S.-Africa relations. While he will highlight projects like the Lobito Corridor — a U.S.-backed infrastructure initiative connecting the Atlantic and Indian Oceans — and push for increased African representation in the U.N. Security Council, these efforts pale in comparison to the attention Africa is receiving from other global powers. Russia and China are expanding their influence through economic, military, and geopolitical means, and the U.S. appears to be lagging behind.
A decade of neglect
Historically, Africa has often been an afterthought in U.S. foreign policy. Under Donald Trump, the region was infamously dismissed with derogatory remarks, and Trump never set foot in Africa during his presidency. Biden’s administration, while less overtly hostile, has not substantially improved relations either. His decision to visit Angola at the end of his term highlights the low priority Africa holds in U.S. policy.
This long-standing neglect has left Africans disillusioned with the U.S. “Overpromising and under-delivering” has been the hallmark of U.S. engagement, according to Cameron Hudson of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Many African leaders now view Washington as an unreliable partner, unwilling to deliver on promises or provide sustained support. This sentiment is particularly strong when it comes to economic and development assistance, which often falls short of expectations.
Growing Russian and Chinese influence
As the U.S. continues to falter in its engagement with Africa, Russia and China are rapidly increasing their presence on the continent. Russian mercenaries, including the notorious Wagner Group, have forged alliances with military juntas in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger. In exchange for resources like diamonds, gold, and lithium, Russia provides military support, a strategy that has been effective in expanding its footprint in these resource-rich nations.
China, meanwhile, has taken a more economic approach, financing massive infrastructure projects across Africa. Since 2009, China has been Africa’s largest trading partner and investor, often securing lucrative contracts that leave countries indebted to Beijing. The economic ties between Africa and China are deepening as Beijing continues to offer deals with fewer strings attached, in contrast to the more conditional aid packages from Western countries.
Cold war echoes
The growing influence of Russia and China in Africa is reminiscent of the Cold War when the U.S. and Soviet Union competed for influence in the developing world. Today, Moscow and Beijing use modern tools, including disinformation campaigns, to sway public opinion in Africa. Russian-funded campaigns, for example, have spread false narratives about U.S. health programs, like the Gates Foundation’s anti-malaria project in Burkina Faso, claiming the initiative aims to infect Africans.
The U.S., meanwhile, finds itself torn between competing priorities. Its goals in Africa are unclear, oscillating between promoting democracy, fighting terrorism, and countering Russian and Chinese influence. This lack of focus has led to a piecemeal approach that satisfies none of these objectives, ultimately weakening America’s position on the continent.
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Coups and chaos
Africa’s political landscape has become increasingly unstable in recent years, with a surge in military coups — nine since 2020, particularly in the Sahel region. While Russia and China have no qualms about working with authoritarian regimes, U.S. laws prevent Washington from partnering with countries led by military juntas. This creates diplomatic contortions, as evidenced by the U.S. response to the 2023 coup in Niger. The Biden administration delayed formally labeling the event a “coup” to maintain some leverage, but ultimately had to withdraw troops and aid, leaving room for Russian and Chinese influence to grow.
The increasing number of coups also complicates U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The Sahel has become the world’s epicenter of terrorist activity, with the region accounting for almost half of global terrorism-related deaths in 2023. As U.S. influence wanes, so does its ability to combat terrorism in the region, raising concerns that extremist groups could eventually pose a threat to U.S. interests abroad.
Looking ahead
While resources for U.S. foreign policy are finite, the next administration — whether led by Harris or Trump — must do more to address the growing challenges in Africa. That includes investing in long-term relationships, filling vacancies in African embassies, and renewing trade agreements like the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, which currently allows duty-free access to the U.S. market for only 32 of Africa’s 54 countries.
Moreover, the U.S. should reconsider its overly moralistic stance on African affairs. For example, while the Biden administration was right to protest Uganda’s anti-homosexuality law, cutting the country off from trade benefits may have done more harm than good by pushing it closer to Russia and China. A more pragmatic approach might yield better results in maintaining influence on the continent.
Ultimately, the U.S. must demonstrate greater interest in Africa if it hopes to remain relevant in the region. Without a clear, consistent policy and increased engagement, Africa will continue to drift toward Russia and China, cementing a new era of geopolitical competition on the continent.
